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A. Contradictions in European Contract Law: The Consistency Problem with the 
Acquis 
 
“Certainty is so essential, that law cannot even be just without it”, Francis Bacon 
once observed in the good old times.1 In the context of the general 20th century’s 
trend from formal to substantive justice,2 however, policy objectives such as dis-
tributive justice, democratic political governance, or effective transnational regula-
tion increasingly came to the focus of private law legislation. The rise of “consum-
erism” in contract law is the paradigmatic example of this development, which – at 
least from a German perspective – was triggered mainly by European measures on 
the harmonisation of private laws.3 While all intellectual capacities were absorbed 
by “regulating contracts”4 in the light of the new principle of “contractual solidar-
ity”5, the basic need of a legal system for overall consistency as a prerequisite for 
                                                 
1   Bacon, DE DIGNITATE ET AUGMENTIS SCIENTARUM, engl. translation, Works V (edited by J. 
Speddings et al.), London 1869, 8th Book, Titel I, Aphorism 8. 
2   See Wieacker, DAS SOZIALMODELL DER KLASSISCHEN PRIVATRECHTSGESETZBÜCHER UND DIE 
ENTWICKLUNG DER MODERNEN GESELLSCHAFT, 1953; see as well Franz Wieacker, Tony Weir 
(trans.), and Reinhard Zimmermann, A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LAW IN EUROPE, Oxford UP 1996; 
Unger, LAW  IN MODERN SOCIETY, 1976, p. 194 et passim; Atiyah/Summers, FORM AND 
SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW, Oxford UP 1987; Calliess, PROZEDURALES RECHT, 1999, 
Chapter 1. 
3   Micklitz, A Comment on Party Autonomy and Consumer Regulation in the European 
Community – A Plea for Consistency, in: Grundmann/Kerber/Weatherill (ed.), PARTY 
AUTONOMY AND THE ROLE OF INFORMATION IN THE INTERNAL MARKET, 2001, 197. 
4   Collins, REGULATING CONTRACTS, Oxford UP 1999 
5   See Thibierge-Guelfucci, Libres propos sur la transformation du droit des contrats, REVUE 
TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT CIVIL 1997, 357 ff. (“principe de fraternité contractuelle”); Lurger, 
GRUNDFRAGEN DER VEREINHEITLICHUNG DES VERTRAGSRECHTS IN DER EUROPÄISCHEN UNION, 
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the administration of justice (“treating like cases alike”)6 obviously got out of sight. 
The critique with regard to pointillism and eclecticism in the European approach to 
private law harmonisation (“piecemeal legislation”), which lead to the patchwork 
character of the acquis communautaire,  is a common place today, even within the 
European Commission.7 However, the conclusion, that has to be drawn, is not for-
mulated straight forward: As consistency goes, arbitrariness comes, an inconsistent 
law is a contradictio in adjecto. 
 
Much of today’s attention of the academia, therefore, is directed towards the draft-
ing of general principles of European private law as a means of enhancing consis-
tency.  The  Principles  of  European  Contract  Law  as  prepared  by  the  Lando-
Commission,8 the follow-up project of the Study Group on a European Civil Code,9 
and the work of the Society of European Contract Law10 are prominent examples.11 
                                                                                                                             
and fairness). On the “principle of good faith” see Zimmermann/Whittaker (eds.), GOOD FAITH 
IN EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, Cambridge UP 2000; and on the “duty to deal fairly” in contract 
law see as well Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper on EU Consumer 
Protection, COM(2001) 531 final 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/fair_bus_pract/green_pap_comm
/fair_comm_greenpap_en.pdf, see as well the overview and follow-up at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/fair_bus_pract/index_en.htm , 
and the Proceedings of the SECOLA Conference of May 2002 in London (www.secola.org). 
6   See MacCormick, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY, Oxford UP 1978, 73; Kelsen, GENERAL 
THEORY OF LAW AND STATES, Harvard UP 1946, 14; Luhmann, DAS RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, 
1993, 223 ff., 231 f.  
7   See the contributions to Grundmann (ed.), SYSTEMBILDUNG UND SYSTEMLÜCKEN IN 
KERNGEBIETEN DES EUROPÄISCHEN PRIVATRECHTS, 2000; Joerges, Interactive Adjudication in the 
Europeanisation Process? A Demanding Perspective and a Modest Example, EUROPEAN REVIEW 
OF PRIVATE LAW (ERPL) 2000, p. 1 ff.; Micklitz (supra note 3); Schlechtriem, Wandlungen des 
Schuldrechts in Europa – wozu und wohin, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR EUROPÄISCHES PRIVATRECHT (ZEUP) 
2002, p. 213 ff.; Calliess, The Limits of Eclecticism in Consumer Law: National Struggles and the 
Hope for a coherent European Contract Law. A Comment on the ECJ' s and  the FCJ' s 
"Heininger"- decisions, GERMAN L.J. Vol. 3 No. 8 - 1 July 2002 – Private Law, available at 
www.germanlawjournal.com/past_issues.php?id=175; Commission of the European 
Communities, Communication on European Contract Law, 2 July 2001, COM(2001) 398 final: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/fair_bus_pract/cont_law/cont_la
w_02_en.pdf  and Consumer Policy Strategy 2002-2006, Communication of 7 May 2002, 
COM(2002) 208 final: http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/c_137/c_13720020608en00020023.pdf  
8   Lando/Beale, (ed.), PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW PARTS I & II, 2000; (Part I & II 1999, 
Part III 2002) available at 
http://www.cbs.dk/departments/law/staff/ol/commission_on_ecl/pecl_full_text.htm  
9   See www.sgecc.net  
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The Lando-Principles and the like are dedicated predominantly to general private 
law, however. As a result, there is still a lack of understanding with regard to the 
underlying principles of the mandatory provisions of the European aquis, namely 
the consumer contract law directives, as well as their interplay with the national 
private laws in  the  framework  of  the  basic  freedoms  of  the  EC-Treaty.  What  is 
needed in terms of a coherent European contract law, is twofold: a list of Principles 
of European (Consumer) Contract Law regarding the harmonised mandatory substan-
tive law,12 and a Constitutional Framework for the competition of the member states’ 
private law systems in the remaining fields, i.e. principles of conflict of laws for the 
internal market.13 
 
In order to better understand these needs, the fundamental contradiction of Euro-
pean private law has to be recalled. The European directives on the harmonisation 
of private law14 follow the “minimum harmonisation approach” established in the 
Commission’s white paper on the completion of the single market in 1985, but do 
not provide for the “mutual recognition” of private laws in the non-harmonised 
fields  (“home-state  principle”  or  “country  of  origin  approach”)  inherent  to  this 
strategy, which was built on the so-called “Cassis-Philosophy” of the ECJ.15 Art. 5 
of  the  1980  Convention  on  the  law  applicable  to  Contractual  Obligations16  (the 
                                                                                                                             
11   See as well the work of the Trento Group (www.jus.unitn.it/dsg/common-core/home.html): see  
Bussani/Mattei (eds.), THE COMMON CORE OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW. ESSAYS ON THE PROJEKT, 
Kluwer Law International 2002;  the Gandolfi Group: Giuseppe Gandolfi (ed.), CODE EUROPEÉN 
DES CONTRATS – AVANT-PROJET, Milano 2001; and there are a lot more „Groups“.   
12   See Micklitz (supra note 3); Consumer Policy Strategy 2002-2006, COM(2002) 208 final; the work 
of the „Acquis Group“ (www.jura.uni-bielefeld.de/Lehrstuehle/Schulte-
Noelke/Institute_Projekte/Acquis_Group/index.html) is dedicated to this topic: see Schulte-
Nölke/Schulze (eds.), EUROPÄISCHES VERTRAGSRECHT IM GEMEINSCHAFTSRECHT, Schriftenreihe 
der Europäischen Rechtsakademie Trier, Vol. 22, 2002 
13   See Grundmann/Kerber, European System of Contract Laws - A Map for Combining the 
Advantages of Centralised and Decentralised Rulemaking, in: Grundmann/Stuyck (eds.), AN 
ACADEMIC GREEN PAPER ON EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, (Kluwer) 2002, draft PDF available at 
www.secola.org Leuven Conference; Grundmann, Binnenmarktkollisionsrecht - vom 
klassischen IPR zur Integrationsordnung, RABELSZ 69 (2000) 457-477; Grundmann, Internationa-
les Privatrecht als Verfassungsordnung, RIW 2002, 329 ff. 
14   See the compilation at Schulze/Zimmermann (eds.), BASISTEXTE ZUM EUROPÄISCHEN 
PRIVATRECHT, 2nd  Ed. 2002; and the commentaries at Grundmann, EUROPÄISCHES 
SCHULDVERTRAGSRECHT, ZGR Sonderheft 15, 1999. 
15   See ECJ of 20 February 1979 (C 120/78) “Cassis de Dijon”; and the Commission White  Paper on 
the Single Market COM (1985) 310; see also Epiney in: C.Calliess/Ruffert (eds.), KOMMENTAR ZU 
EUV UND EGV, 2nd Ed. July 2002, Art. 28 EGV (EC-Treaty) No. 20 et seq. 
16   Consolidated version at OJ C 27 of 26 January 1998, p. 34-46: http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/pri/en/oj/dat/1998/c_027/c_02719980126en00340053.pdf see as well www.rome-
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“Rome Convention”) follows for consumer contracts instead the “country of desti-
nation”-approach. Unless the consumer travelled outside his country on its own 
initiative (the “active consumer”),  the law of the state of the consumer’s habitual 
residence applies (Art. 5 (3) Rome Convention). A choice of law will not prevent the 
application of the mandatory protection rules of the “passive” consumer’s state of 
habitual residence, unless the chosen law provides for an even higher level of pro-
tection, thus leading to a situation called “dépeçage”, i.e. where different parts of a 
contract are ruled by the laws of two countries (Art. 5 (2) Rome Convention).17  
 
The fact, that the minimum harmonisation directives are transposed into national 
private  laws  in  very  different  ways,  here  and  there  providing  for  a  so-called 
“higher level of protection”, led to a situation of complex fragmentation of private 
laws. In cases, where the directives are not harmonising protection rules, which 
were already existent in the member states, but introduce new ones, even new re-
stricting impediments on the free movement of goods and services in the internal 
market have been created. The Distance Selling Directive may serve as an exam-
ple:18 Art. 6 foresees a right of the consumer to cancellation of distant selling con-
tracts, which has to be executed within a so-called  cooling-off period of “seven 
working days”, but Art. 14 allows for a comparatively higher level of protection in 
the  member  states.  In  transposing  the  directive  into  national  laws  the  member 
states have taken different approaches with regard to the lengths and calculation of 
such a period: 7 working days (Belgium, England, Spain, Netherlands), 10 days 
(Italy), 14 days (Norway), and 2 weeks (Germany).19 In any case the period will not 
start to run unless the consumer was properly informed on his right of cancellation 
(Art. 6).  
 
Since Art. 5 of the Rome Convention is predominantly held to be applicable to B2C-
E-Commerce  transactions20  and  the  home-state  principle  of  Art.  3  of  the  E-
                                                 
17   See Foss/ Bygrave, International Consumer Purchases Through The Internet: Jurisdictional 
Issues Pursuant To European Law, IJL&IT 2000 8 (99); Heiss, in: Czernich/Heiss (eds.), EVÜ – 
DAS EUROPÄISCHE SCHULDVERTRAGSÜBEREINKOMMEN. Kommentar, 1999, Art. 5; Magnus in: 
STAUDINGER, EGBGB, Art. 29 (2002). 
18   Directive 97/7/EC, OJ 1997 L 144/19 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/dist_sell/index_en.htm  
19   See the country reports in Spindler/Börner (ed.), E-COMMERCE-LAW IN EUROPE AND THE USA, 
2002, where sometimes it is not reported, wether the term days is restricted to working days or 
not. 
20   Magnus, in: STAUDINGER (2002), Art. 28 EGBGB Note 653-655 2003]                                                                                                                                     337  Coherence and Consistency 
Commerce  Directive21  shall  not  apply  to  consumer  contracts22,  an  E-Shop  doing 
business throughout Europe has to take into account the private laws of 15 (and 
soon 25) member states, when drafting its terms and conditions.23 A choice of law 
clause will prevent the applicability of the law of the consumer’s country only, if 
the law chosen provides a higher level of protection. Here the management has to 
decide, if a period of e.g. 10 days or 7 working days constitutes a higher level of 
protection, which is dependant on the applicable holidays and the individual day 
of delivery of the product. Any mistake in providing the consumer with correct 
information on the right of cancellation, including the method of calculation of the 
period, will result in the cooling-off period never starting. The consumer then may 
execute  the  right  of  cancellation  within  a  period  of  minimum  three  months  (in 
Germany even unlimited24), while not being obliged to pay for the use of the prod-
uct in the meantime. Since used items are worthless to a seller, who regularly does 
not run a second-hand shop, an E-Shop distributing throughout the internal market 
runs a high risk of loss, due to potential returns. While the big players are able to 
distribute these costs on a high turn over (self-insurance), the same might not be 
true for small and middle-sized enterprises (“SME”), because there is no third party 
insurance available at the market for a reasonable price.25 
 
Thus, it is still difficult, if not impossible, for businesses to develop distribution 
strategies that can be applied throughout the internal market.26 With growing glob-
alisation facilitated by the Euro and catalysed by E-Commerce the consumer-state 
                                                 
21   Directive 2000/31/EC, OJ L 178/1 
http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&n
umdoc=32000L0031&model=guichett  
22   Spindler, Herkunftslandprinzip und Kollisionsrecht - Binnenmarktintegration ohne 
Harmonisierung? Die Folgen der Richtlinie im elektronischen Geschäftsverkehr für das 
Kollisionsrecht, RABELSZ 2002, 633, 684 f. 
23   Vgl. Glatt, VERTRAGSSCHLUSS IM INTERNET, 2002, p. 123 ff.; otherwise Maack, DIE DURCHSETZUNG 
DES AGB-RECHTLICHEN TRANSPARENZGEBOTS IN INTERNATIONALEN VERBRAUCHERVERTRÄGEN, 
2001, p. 155 ff., 186 
24   Para. 355 (3) Sentence 3 German Civil Code (BGB), which was introduced as a result of the ECJ’s 
Heininger decision, see Calliess (supra note 7) 
www.germanlawjournal.com/past_issues.php?id=175 
25   The reason fort he unavailability of market-insurance in case of guarantees or late cancellations 
due to a failure of informing the consumer properly about his rights is simply, that there are 
involved to many potential moral hazards on the side of the seller. An insurer offering a 
respective police, thus, would attract too many bad risks. See only Wehrt, Warranties, in: 
Bouckaert/De Geest (eds.), ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, Volume III., 2000, S. 179 ff. 
26   For a detailed analysis see von Bar/Lando/Swann, Communication on European Contract Law: 
Joint Response of the Commission on European Contract Law and the Study Group on a 
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principle may even turn out to be detrimental to consumers, especially in small 
member-states, where businesses might refuse to deal. Managers might be reluctant 
to invest in the adaptation of standardised contract clauses, information policies, 
and marketing practices for a small number of potential consumers in lets say Lux-
embourg  or  Lithuania.  To  summarize:  the  minimum  harmonisation  approach 
without there being included a mutual recognition clause with regard to the re-
maining fields does not only appear to be completely useless in terms of overcom-
ing restricting impediments on the free movement of goods. As the example of the 
minimum harmonised cancellation period illustrates, it might even create new im-
pediments.  
 
The inverse effect on the internal market resulting from this somewhat strange in-
terplay of the harmonisation directives and Art. 5 Rome Convention has led to the 
question, if the acquis of European consumer contract law is justifiable in the light of 
the basic freedoms, especially Art. 28 of the EC-Treaty,27 and, moreover, if the re-
spective directives are covered at all by the competence rule of Art. 95 EC-Treaty.28 
For under Art. 5 and 95 EC-Treaty a limited and specific power is conferred to the 
Community only, where the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States in fact 
helps to overcome impediments restricting the free movement of goods and ser-
vices in the internal market.29 It is commonly held that the consumer-state principle 
of Art. 5 Rome Convention, even while constituting a restriction on the free move-
ment of goods, can be justified as a compelling necessity of public policy (i.e. con-
sumer protection) in accordance with the adjudication of the ECJ.30 However, the 
ECJ has made clear, that the principle of proportionality has to be applied.31 Here 
                                                 
27   Drasch, DAS HERKUNFTSLANDPRINZIP IM INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATRECHT, 1997, p. 288 et passim 
28   See Roth, Europäischer Verbraucherschutz und BGB, JURISTENZEITUNG (JZ) 2001, 475; Calliess, 
Nach der Schuldrechtsreform: Perspektiven des Verbrauchervertragsrechts, ARCHIV FÜR DIE 
CIVILISTISCHE PRAXIS (ACP) 203 (2003), forthcoming. 
29   See ECJ Case C-376/98, Judgement of 5 October 2000, http://curia.eu.int/jurisp/cgi-
bin/form.pl?lang=en&Submit=Submit&docrequire=alldocs&numaff=C-
376%2F98&datefs=&datefe=&nomusuel=&domaine=&mots=&resmax=100 , where the ECJ an-
nulled the Directive 98/43/EC on advertising and sponsorship of tobacco products for not being 
covered by the powers specifically conferred on the Community under Art. 95 EC-Treaty, since 
the Directive in question in fact did not “genuinely have as its object the improvement of the 
conditions for the establishment and functioning of the internal market.” (No. 81 ff., 84). 
30   See only Roth, Der Einfluss des Europäischen Gemeinschaftsrechts auf das Internationale 
Privatrecht, RABELSZ 1991, 623; Basedow, Der kollisionsrechtliche Gehalt der Produktfreiheiten 
im europäischen Binnenmarkt: favor offerentis, RABELSZ 1995, 1, 15. 
31   Starting with ECJ of 20 February 1979 (C 120/78) “Cassis de Dijon”, where the ECJ ruled, that a 
rule prescribing a minimum alcohol percentage for liquor is improportionate, if an information 
rule will suffice; see as well Epiney in: Calliess/Ruffert (eds.), KOMMENTAR ZU EUV UND EGV, 
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the assessment of proportionality in the strict sense, i.e. the weighing and balancing 
of conflicting rights, interests, and policies, cannot be done without taking the pa-
ternalistic  effects  of  the  consumer  state  principle  into  account.  The  citizens  of 
Europe do not only have a right to a high level of consumer protection32, but as well a 
right to free access to the internal market, indicating that the basic freedoms do not 
only constitute individual rights for the supply side, but also to the consumers at 
the demand side of the internal market.33 In addition, the principle of proportional-
ity leads to the question of the necessity of the impediment, i.e. the question if there 
are  not  other  possible  measures  to  protect  the  consumer  in  cross-border  trade, 
which would have less severe restricting effects on  the basic freedoms than the 
current combination of minimum harmonisation measures and Art. 5 Rome Con-
vention.  
 
Basically there are two potential solutions to the problem. First of all, where the 
place of business of the party which is to effect the characteristic performance ("the 
business") is situated in a member state of the EC (or EEA), the home-state principle 
could be applied to consumer contracts. This rule is already laid down in Art. 4 (2) 
of the Rome Convention, but it is derogated by Art. 5 for the passive consumer. The 
principle of mutual recognition could be applied at least, where the consumer pro-
tection  rules  in  question  are  harmonised  throughout  the  EU  by  directives  at  a 
minimum level.34 This solution formed the centre of a highly controversial discus-
sion in the course of the drafting of the E-commerce Directive (2000/31/EC). Fi-
nally it was left to be addressed in the context of the envisaged reform of the Rome 
Convention.35  
 
Another solution could be a European Civil Code, which is believed by many to 
provide a coherent set of rules for cross-border consumer contracts and, thus, to 
eliminate  the  necessity  to  deal  with  the  complex  fragmentation  of  the  member 
states’  consumer  contract  regimes.  This  option  was  extensively  discussed  in  re-
sponse to the Commission' s Communication on European Contract Law of 2 July 
2001.36 The Commission received 181 comments to that communication from gov-
                                                 
32   Art. 153 (1) EC-Treaty and Art. 38 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (OJ C 
364/1 of 18. December 2000). 
33   See Reich, BÜRGERRECHTE IN DER EUROPÄISCHEN UNION, 1999, p. 266 f. („passive 
Marktfreiheiten“) with extensive reference to the ECJ.  
34   See Grundmann (supra note 14) Part 1 Note 80, 118 
35   Spindler, Herkunftslandprinzip und Kollisionsrecht - Binnenmarktintegration ohne 
Harmonisierung? Die Folgen der Richtlinie im elektronischen Geschäftsverkehr für das 
Kollisionsrecht, RABELSZ 2002, 633 
36   Commission communication to the Council and Parliament concerning the European contract 
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ernments  and  stakeholders,  including  businesses,  legal  practitioners,  academics 
and  consumer  organisations.  In  addition,  the  Communication  sparked  a  large 
number of law review articles and legal monographs.37 
 
On 14 January 2003 the Commission published the “Green Paper on the conversion 
of the Rome Convention of 1980 on the law applicable to contractual obligations 
into a Community instrument and its modernisation” (the “Green Paper”).38 And 
on 12 February 2003 the Commission published the Communication “A More Co-
herent European Contract Law. An Action Plan” (the “Action Plan”).39 The latter is 
a follow-up document to the Communication of July 2001 and draws conclusions 
from the responses and makes further suggestions. Both the European contract law 
project and the modernisation of the Rome Convention project complement each 
other and will be conducted in parallel.40 In the following, both communications 
shall be presented briefly with regard to potential solutions to the described con-
tradictions in the European consumer contract law acquis. In a second step I shall 
present some suggestions of my own. 
 
                                                                                                                             
http://europa.eu.int/comm/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/fair_bus_pract/cont_law/cont_la
w_02_en.pdf ; all comments and follow-up documents available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/fair_bus_pract/cont_law/index_
en.htm  
37   See only Grundmann/Stuyck (eds.), AN ACADEMIC GREEN PAPER ON EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, 
(Kluwer) 2002; von Bar/Lando/Swann, Communication on European Contract Law: Joint 
Response of the Commission on European Contract Law and the Study Group on a European 
Civil Code, ERPL 2002, 182-248; Staudenmayer, The Commission Communication on European 
Contract Law and the Future Prospects, 51 INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 
(2002), 673-688; Schlechtriem, Wandlungen des Schuldrechts in Europa – wozu und wohin, 
ZEUP 2002, 213 ff.; Kötz, Alte und neue Aufgaben der Rechtsvergleichung, JZ 2002, 257 ff.; 
Schwintowski, Auf dem Weg zu einem Europäischen Zivilgesetzbuch, JZ 2002, 205 ff.; 
Sonnenberger, Privatrecht und Internationales Privatrecht im künftigen Europa: Fragen und 
Perspektiven, RECHT DER IINTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT (RIW) 2002, 489 ff.; Grundmann, 
Internationales Privatrecht als Verfassungsordnung, RIW 2002, 329 ff.; Ott/Schäfer, Die 
Vereinheitlichung des europäischen Vertragsrechts. Ökonomische Notwendigkeit oder 
akademisches Interesse, in: Ott/Schäfer (ed.), VEREINHEITLICHUNG UND DIVERSITÄT DES 
ZIVILRECHTS IN TRANSNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFTSRÄUMEN, 2002, p. 203 ff.; Eidenmüller, 
Obligatorische versus optionales europäisches Vertragsgesetzbuch, in: Ott/Schäfer (ed.), 
VEREINHEITLICHUNG UND DIVERSITÄT DES ZIVILRECHTS IN TRANSNATIONALEN 
WIRTSCHAFTSRÄUMEN, 2002, p.237 ff. 
38   COM(2002) 654 final. http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/pri/en/dpi/gpr/doc/2002/com2002_0654en01.doc see as well 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/news/intro/news_160103_2_en.htm  
39   COM(2003) 68 final http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/cnc/2003/com2003_0068en01.pdf  
40   See Green Paper COM(2002) 654 final at 1.6 2003]                                                                                                                                     341  Coherence and Consistency 
 
B. The Action Plan: A Farewell to an European Civil Code? 
 
The Commission Communication on European contract law of July 200141 launched 
a process of consultation and discussion about the way in which problems resulting 
from divergences between national contract laws in the EU should be dealt with at 
the European level. First of all the Commission wanted to collect information on 
potential impediments, created by the current fragmentation of European private 
law systems with regard to the internal market. This information is essential with a 
view to the extent of the competence of the EC regarding further harmonisation 
measures in the field of private law under Art. 95 EC-Treaty. Secondly, the Com-
mission asked for comments on potential solutions, while offering four different 
options: 1) leaving the solution to the market with a view to self-regulatory ap-
proaches, i.e. the Lex Mercatoria and the like; 2) Promoting further research  on 
common principles of European private law (e.g. the Lando-Principles)  in order to 
create a common framework of reference, which could be used as a guideline for 
contract parties, arbitrators, and legislators, including future Community measures; 
3) harmonising harmonisation, i.e. consolidating and modernising the acquis with 
regard to coherence and consistency, common definitions etc.; and 4) creating a 
new  community  measure  (potentially  a  regulation)  on  European  contract  law, 
which could be mandatory and thus replace the national contract laws a) in all 
cases, or b) only in case of European cross-border transactions, or c) an optional 
code, where the parties could opt in or out by means of choice of law. 
 
The consultation process resulted in the identification of a huge variety of prob-
lems.42 It was made clear that these difficulties are not only related to inconsisten-
cies in the contract law acquis, i.e. the mandatory European provisions and their 
incoherent transposition in national private laws, but that problems arise also in 
areas where party autonomy is not limited. Especially SMEs are faced with prob-
lems  concerning  the  drafting  of  general  business  terms  that  could  be  applied 
throughout the internal market; the individual drafting of complete contracts may 
be too expensive; and while choice of law clauses solve the problem for one party 
(usually the economically dominant one) only they do not prevent the applicability 
of different laws to related contracts, e.g. in case of international import under for-
eign law and national resale.43 Moreover, it was emphasized that problems do not 
                                                 
41   See the Executive Summary in COM(2001) 398 final. 
42   See the summary of the consultation process in the Action Plan COM(2003) 68 final, Part 3 
43   E.g. Schlechtriem/Schmidt-Kessel, Urteilsanmerkung zu BGH-Urteil vom 25.11.1998 - VIII ZR 
259/97, Grenzüberschreitender Kauf, Vereinbarung deutschen Rechts in AGB, Mängelrüge, 
Verzicht, Verwirkung, in: EWIR 1999, 257; see as well the thorough analysis at von 
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only arise from contract law, but also in the related areas of property law and secu-
rities on movable goods as well as in the law of unjust enrichment.44 While the ma-
jority of academic contributions favoured the drafting of an European code as a 
solution,  governments,  businesses  and  other  stakeholders  were  less  enthusiastic 
about this option.45 
 
As a result, the Action Plan, although maintaining the consultative character of the 
process and indicating the intention to further reflect on a future “optional instru-
ment”, suggests a mix of non-regulatory and regulatory measures, which are best 
described as a combination of options 2 and 3 of the July 2001 communication. In 
other words, the most important conclusion, the Commission draws from the con-
sultation  process,  is  that  “there  is no  need  to  abandon  the  current sector-specific  ap-
proach”46. The project of the drafting of a European Civil Code is, thus, put off the 
agenda: “In the Commission' s opinion, the ‘European  contract law project’ does 
neither aim at the uniformisation of contract law nor at the adoption of a European 
civil  law  code”.47  The  Commission  announces  a  threefold  action  plan  instead, 
which shall be outlined below. 
 
 
1) A Common Frame of Reference  
 
The  Commission  intends  to  create  a  common  frame  of  reference  (the  “Frame”), 
establishing common principles and terminology in the area of European contract 
law in the form of a non-binding, publicly accessible document. The Frame should 
1) help the Community institutions in ensuring greater coherence of the existing 
and future acquis, 2) become an instrument in achieving a higher degree of conver-
gence between the contract laws of the EU Member States, and 3) serve as a basis 
for a possible future optional instrument. The drafting of the Frame will be based 
on extensive research, which the Commission intends to finance within the context 
of the Sixth Framework Programme for research and technological development. 
The Frame is expected to cover general rules on the conclusion, validity and inter-
                                                                                                                             
Commission on European Contract Law and the Study Group on a European Civil Code, ERPL 
2002, 182, 194 ff. 
44   See von Bar/Lando/Swann, Communication on European Contract Law: Joint Response of the 
Commission on European Contract Law and the Study Group on a European Civil Code, ERPL 
2002, 182, 206 ff. 
45   See Ott/Schäfer, Die Vereinheitlichung des europäischen Vertragsrechts. Ökonomische 
Notwendigkeit oder akademisches Interesse (supra note 37). 
46   See Action Plan COM(2003) 68 final, Executive Summary, Paragraph 1. 
47   See Green Paper COM(2002) 654 final at 1.6 2003]                                                                                                                                     343  Coherence and Consistency 
pretation of contracts as well as performance, non-performance and remedies, and 
rules  on  credit  securities  on  movable  goods  and  the  law  of  unjust  enrichment. 
Drawing on the existing national private law systems and the respective case law of 
national high courts, the Frame obviously shall follow the Common Core approach 
of the Lando-Commission and the Restatements of Law of the American Law Insti-
tute.48 
 
 
2) EU-wide Standard Contract Terms 
 
In order to facilitate single distribution strategies throughout the internal market, 
the  Commission  intends  to  promote  the  drafting  of  sector  specific  standardised 
contract terms, the application of which is not limited to a specific member state’s 
private law system, but which are designed for EU-wide cross-border transactions. 
A special website shall be established as a platform for exchange of information on 
related private initiatives. Furthermore, the Commission will publish guidelines, 
indicating points to consider in drafting such terms with respect to mandatory EU-
contact law and the competition rules as well as recommending the participation of 
all stakeholders, including consumer associations, in the  drafting process. How-
ever, the Commission does not intend to accredit the conformity of specific stan-
dardised contract terms with EU-law. 
 
 
3) Consolidation, Codification, and Recasting of the Acquis 
 
In order to ensure a more coherent European contract law, the Commission intends 
to  improve  the  quality  of  the  existing  acquis  with  regard  to  its  transparency, 
simplicity and consistency. Such action would deal with areas already covered by 
EC  legislation,  i.e.  remedying  identified  inconsistencies  in  EC  contract  law  by 
simplifying  and  clarifying  existing  legislation,  but  would  also  entail  the 
modernisation of the acquis, i.e. the adaptation of existing legislation to economic, 
commercial  and  other  developments  which  were  not  foreseen  at  the  time  of 
adoption. A further task would be to fill such gaps in EC legislation that have led to 
particular problems with regard to its application. These measures are identified by 
the Commission as a priority that needs to be “tackled rapidly”. In addition, the 
Commission will continue to submit new proposals where a sector-specific need for 
harmonisation arises. 
                                                 
48   See Schmid, Legitimitätsbedingungen eines Europäischen Zivilgesetzbuchs, JZ 2001, 433; 
Schmid, Neuordnungsperspektiven im europäischen Privatrecht. Plädoyer für ein Europäisches 
Rechtsinstitut und für „Restatements“ über europäisches Recht, in: JAHRBUCH JUNGER 
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With regard to consumer contract law, the Commission already in its Communica-
tion on Consumer Policy Strategy for 2002-200649, revealed its intention to remove 
existing inconsistencies, to fill in gaps and to simplify legislation. The use of com-
mon definitions (e.g. of consumer contracts) and the harmonisation of cooling-off 
periods  were  indeed  given  high  priority.  Moreover,  the  appropriateness  of  the 
minimum harmonisation approach was questioned in this area, since it leads to 
great diversity in national regimes and thus creates obstacles for cross-border busi-
ness to consumer transactions. The Commission concluded that there is “a need to 
review and reform existing EU consumer protection directives, to bring them up to 
date and progressively adapt them from minimum harmonisation to ‘full harmonisation’ 
measures … The simple application of mutual recognition, without harmonisation, 
is  not  likely  to  be  appropriate  for  such  consumer  protection  issues.  However, 
provided a sufficient degree of harmonisation is achieved, the country of origin 
approach could be applied to remaining questions.” 
 
 
C. The Green Paper: A Farewell to the Consumer-State Principle? 
 
1. The Conversion of the Rome Convention into a Regulation 
 
With the Green Paper50, published on 14 January 2003, the Commission launched a 
consultation process aimed at the conversion of the Rome Convention of 1980 on 
the law applicable to contractual obligations into a Community instrument and its 
modernisation, inviting interested parties to send reasoned replies to the questions 
raised until September 2003. In the general context of the concept of the European 
Union as an area of freedom, security and justice (Art. 2 indent 4 EU-Treaty), this 
initiative forms part of the project on the creation of an European judicial area. The 
Treaty of Amsterdam made judicial co-operation in civil matters a full-scale EC 
policy.  On  the  basis  of  Article  61(c)  EC-Treaty  the  Community  meanwhile  has 
adopted several new Regulations (Brussels II,  Bankruptcy,  Service of documents  
and Evidence) and converted the Brussels Convention of 1968 into a Regulation 
(Brussels  I).51  Currently  an  instrument  on  the  law  applicable  to  non-contractual 
obligations (Rome II) is prepared.52 In this process of European codification of pri-
                                                 
49   COM(2002) 208 final 
50   COM(2002) 654 final 
51   See the overview at http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/fsj/civil/fsj_civil_intro_en.htm  
52   See the Follow-up of the consultation on a preliminary draft proposal for a Council Regulation 
on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations ("Rome II") at 
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vate international law the conversion of the Rome Convention into a Community 
Regulation seems to be a logical consequence in terms of coherence and consis-
tency: the ECJ would have jurisdiction over all Community instruments, so that the 
problem of uniform interpretation of the Rome Convention and the related con-
cepts of the Brussels I Regulation could be solved. 
 
 
2. Modernisation of the Consumer Protection Approach 
 
With regard to the modernisation of the Rome Convention a variety of options are 
presented, a comprehensive assessment of which would go beyond the scope of 
this paper. A central point on the reform agenda is the consumer protection issue, 
however, and it is the one which is most closely related to the Action Plan. Delib-
erations on a reform of Art. 5 took place already on occasion of the Austrian acces-
sion to the Convention in 1996, where the Member States undertook to further con-
sider the issue in the near future.53 In addition, the Rome Convention was always 
seen as complementing the 1968 Brussels Convention. In drafting Art. 5 Rome Con-
vention the consumer jurisdiction rule in Art. 13 Brussels Convention, as amended 
in the light of the ECJ Bertrand decision54 on occasion of the accession of the UK, 
Ireland, and Denmark in 1978, was taken as a blueprint. Thus, the protection con-
cept of Art. 5 stems from the late seventies, a time when consumer protection was 
still in its infancy, and there were no harmonisation measures at the Community 
level at all. Although the Rome Convention came into force in 1991 only, due to 
rapid changes in the socio-legal environment the regulatory concept of Art. 5 seems 
to be quite outdated today.  
 
On the one hand, the ongoing trend towards globalisation, catalysed by the decrease 
in transaction costs resulting from new information technologies like the Internet, 
the lift of trade barriers in the context of the EC and the WTO, and the introduction 
of the Euro, has lead and will continue to lead to an unprecedented increase in con-
sumers’ involvement in international cross-border trade, often performed at a dis-
tance. Therefore, the Brussels and Rome Conventions’ distinction between active 
and passive consumers is held to be more and more  inappropriate, especially in 
                                                                                                                             
as well Hamburg Group for Private International Law, Comments on the European Commis-
sion' s Draft Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obli-
gations, RABELSZ 2003, 1-56. 
53   Explanatory Report on the Convention on the accession of the Republic of Austria, the Republic 
of Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden, available at: http://www.rome-
convention.org/instruments/i_rep_afs_en.htm 
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the context of electronic commerce. As a result, the protection concept in the new 
Art. 15 of the Brussels I Regulation was already changed.55  
 
On the other hand, the legal context was altered in a profound way. In the Seventies 
there was no relevant difference between the Member States’ and third states’ pri-
vate laws in terms of the provided level of consumer protection. That is to say, 
while some Member States like the UK and Denmark as well as third states like the 
USA or Sweden were very much engaged in consumerism, other Member States as 
well as a number of other states remained comparatively more reluctant to engage 
in consumer protection. Consequently, Art. 5 Rome Convention treats all private 
laws equal: if there is an international contract, every national private law in the 
world may be chosen, be that French or Chinese law; and irrespective of the parties'  
choice the passive consumer is always protected by the mandatory rules of the law 
of the state of her habitual residence. However, within the past decades the EC 
released an ever increasing amount of directives on the harmonisation of the Mem-
ber  States’  contract  laws,  establishing  mandatory  protection  rules  for  so-called 
weaker  parties,  that  are  predominantly  applicable  to  consumer-contracts,  but  to 
businesses as well.56 While in the late Eighties there have been only some sector 
specific “European islands”, European measures underwent increasing condensa-
tion in the Nineties to what is today commonly referred to as “European contract 
law” or the “Acquis”. In German contract law, for instance, there is today not a sin-
gle consumer-specific protection rule which is not based on a European measure.57 
As a result, it became impossible for the German legislator to autonomously estab-
lish a coherent law of obligations, since any ever so reasonable generalisation on the 
national level bears the risk of being voided by the ECJ.58 
 
                                                 
55   Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, OJ L 012 , 16/01/2001 p. 1-23, 
available at 
http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&n
umdoc=32001R0044&model=guichett  
56   See again Grundmann, EUROPÄISCHES SCHULDVERTRAGSRECHT, 1999. 
57   There are, of course, general mandatory protection rules like § 138 BGB, which protect any party, 
including, but not limited to consumers: an example is the protection of private guarantors (see 
BVerfG, NJW 1994, 36), which are not protected by Community measures, if the credit 
agreement secured by the guarantee is not a consumer contract: see ECJ Case C-45/96 – 
Dietzinger, ECR 1998 I-1199. 
58   This was illustrated by the Heininger-Case of the ECJ and the resulting reform of the German 
reform of the law of obligations: see Calliess (supra note 7) 
www.germanlawjournal.com/past_issues.php?id=175; see as well Safferling, Re-Kodifizierung 
des BGB im Zeitalter der Europäisierung des Zivilrechts – ein Anachronismus?, in: JAHRBUCH 
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These changes in the socio-legal context of Art. 5 Rome Convention had essential 
consequences regarding the relation of the European contract law project and the 
reform of Art. 5 Rome Convention. Before this issue is elaborated in more detail, the 
solutions proposed by the Green Paper shall be addressed briefly. 
 
 
a) Codification of sector-specific rules, limiting the choice of the law of third 
states 
 
As has been pointed out, the Rome Convention follows a national and at the same 
time universal approach, but does not take into account the supranational dimension 
of the European contract law acquis, which was not yet existent in the late seventies. 
Thus,  a  cross-border  contract  between  parties  domiciled  in  different  countries 
within the internal market is regarded as international, and the parties may choose 
a third country law. The German courts had to decide on cases, for instance, where 
German tourists during their stay in Spain were sold time-share rights under the 
laws of the Isle of Man.59 In order to guarantee the  mandatory community law 
standards in cases with a close connection to a Member State of the EU, many direc-
tives contain specific rules limiting the effect of the parties choice of a third states’ 
law.60 However, the proliferation of such special rules outside the Rome convention 
is a source of serious concern.61 
 
It was therefore suggested to codify these special rules by means of an extension of 
Art. 3 (3) of the Rome Convention, thereby treating the Community as a single 
state.62 In its Green Paper, the Commission eventually  sketched the following solu-
tion which draws in fact on a suggestion by the European Group for Private Inter-
national Law (GEDIP)63: “The fact that the parties have chosen the law of a non-
                                                 
59   Rauscher, Gran Carnaria - Isle of Man - Was kommt danach? Plädoyer für einen europäischen 
Ordre Public,  EUROPÄISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT (EUZW) 1996, 650 – 653; BGHZ 
135, 124 = NJW 1997, 1697: no right to revocation under HWiG (legislation transposing Directive 
85/577/EEC on contracts concluded away from business premises into German law) in case of a 
contract on a time-share in a flat located in Spain, concluded between a German tourist and a 
business domiciled on the Isle of Man on ocassion of a promotion event in the respective holiday 
resort, to which the tourist was invited while walking around in the streets of the Spanish city. 
60  See e.g. Art. 6(2) of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive (1993/13/EC); Art. 9 Timeshare 
Directive (1994/47/EC); Art. 12(2) Distance Selling Directive (97/7/EC); Art. 7(3) Consumer 
Sales Directive (1999/44/EC); Art 11(3) Distance Financial Services Directive (2002/65/EC) 
61   See Green Paper at 3.1.1.1. 
62   Basedow, Materielle Rechtsangleichung und Kollisionsrecht, in: Schnyder/Heiss/Rudisch (eds.), 
INTERNATIONALES VERBRAUCHERSCHUTZRECHT, 1995, 11, 34 
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member  country  shall  not  prejudice  the  application  of  the  mandatory  rules  of 
Community law where all the other elements relevant to the situation at the time 
when the contract is signed are connected with one or more Member States.” How-
ever, this clause might not be sufficient to cover all problematic cases. In the men-
tioned time-share case decided by the FCJ, for instance, the seller’s seat was situ-
ated on the Isle of Man.64 If this was not only a P.O.-Box address, but the central 
administration or principal place of business of the seller under Art. 4 (2) Rome 
Convention,  the  contract  would  remain  international  even  under  the  proposed 
extension of Art. 3 (3) of the Convention. 
 
Therefore, the specific conflict rules contained in the consumer contract law direc-
tives, which in Germany were recently consolidated in Art. 29 a EGBGB,65 guaran-
tee their application not only in pure internal market cases, but in all cases where 
the contract has a close connection  to the territory of the Member States. However, 
the meaning of that term in relation to Art. 4 ( 1 ) (closest connection), or Art. 5 (2) 
and 7 ( 1 ) Rome Convention is quite unclear.66 Moreover, in its Ingmar decision the 
ECJ despite a choice of the law of the US-based principal applied the mandatory 
protection rules of the commercial agents directive (86/653/EEC), which contains 
no specific conflict rule, solely on the ground of the agent pursuing his activities in 
a Member State.67 While the former extensions may be covered by a reformed Art. 
5, the latter issue could only be addressed within the context of Art. 7.68 
 
 
b) Ratio of Art. 5 Rome Convention 
 
International contract law, embracing the principles of party autonomy (Art. 3) and  
closest connection (Art. 4), is based on the comitas doctrine, under which national 
courts do not necessarily have to apply domestic law, but foreign private laws as 
well. The underlying idea is that all national contract laws are more or less equiva-
lent in providing for ius commutativa, i.e. a just balance of interests between the par-
ties, but at the same time are marked by the absence of public policies (i.e. pure pri-
vate law).69 As a result there is no public interest in the application of the domestic 
                                                 
64   BGHZ 135, 124 ff. 
65   See Magnus, in: STAUDINGER (2002), commentary on Art. 29 a EGBGB 
66   Klauer, DAS EUROPÄISCHE KOLLISIONSRECHT DER VERBRAUCHERVERTRÄGE ZWISCHEN RÖMER EVÜ 
UND EG-RICHTLINIEN, 2002, 174 ff. 
67  ECJ Case 381/98, judgment of 9 November 2000 
68   See Green Paper at 3.2.8.3 
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private law. However, with the rise of consumerism in private law this general 
presumption of equivalence is questioned. Although the move from formal to sub-
stantive concepts of justice is a general trend at least in the OECD countries, the 
consumer protection approaches of the different private law systems vary substan-
tially, where some national legislators are dedicated to a quite aggressive consum-
erism, while others must be seen as having been much more reluctant. It follows, 
that states with a relatively high level of consumer protection develop a public in-
terest in the application of their mandatory protection regime even in international 
situations. 
 
It is obvious, however, that the business man ordering a meal in Hong Kong or the 
tourist buying sunglasses in Miami cannot rely on the mandatory laws of the state 
of their habitual residence, only because he or she believes this legal regime to be 
more favourable to the issue. In making a distinction between the active and the 
passive consumer Art. 5 follows the public international law approach of territorial-
ity. Where a business came to the consumer and, thus, entered the domestic market 
by means  of marketing, i.e. sending in an agent, making specific invitations,  or 
simply by advertising, or by inducing the consumer to travel abroad in order to 
conclude a contract, the  domestic protection regime applies. While according to 
Art. 3(3) and Art 4(2) a contract is purely domestic only, where the contract is con-
cluded through a place of business in the country of the habitual residence of the 
other party, Art. 5(2) extends the scope of the domestic mandatory rules to all kinds 
of  indirect  (agent,  broker,  or  other  intermediary)  and  distant  (mail,  telephone, 
internet) marketing techniques, addressing the consumer in its home-country. The 
underlying idea here is, that the consumer might not be aware of an international 
situation and the potential applicability of foreign law, where he is approached in 
his habitual environment. 
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c) Extending the Scope of Art. 5 
 
Art. 5 is commonly criticised for its limited scope, leaving the consumer unreasona-
bly unprotected in many cases. This critique is very much a result of the adjudica-
tion of the ECJ on the related concept in Art. 13 of the former 1968 Brussels Conven-
tion, and of the German Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice – “FCJ”) on Art. 
29 EGBGB, transposing Art. 5 Rome Convention into German law. Both Courts 
have interpreted the consumer protection rules as exceptions to the general rules on 
jurisdiction and applicable law in a very restrictive and narrow way and did not 
allow for any argument by analogy (singularia non sunt extendenda).70 
 
 
aa) The revision of the definition of consumer contracts in Art. 5( 1 ) 
 
First of all this is true for the definition of consumer contracts in Art. 5 ( 1 ): “This 
article applies to a contract the object of which is the supply of goods or services …or the 
provision of credit for that object”. This concept could be understood in light of the 
basic freedoms of free movement of goods and services as covering essentially all 
kinds of cross-border trade. However, the German FCJ decided to construe these 
terms quite narrowly within the context of the traditional system of general con-
tract types in national German contract law.71 It follows, that a lot of cross-border 
consumer contracts concerning e.g. the transfer of rights in and the lease of immov-
able property (including time-share)72, the transfer of shares73 in associations, part-
nerships, corporations, or other securities, the transfer of obligations, and the provi-
sion of insurance or credit not linked to the supply of goods or services, are not 
covered by Art. 5 Rome Convention,74 although there are a variety of Community 
measures and national laws providing mandatory protection rules in these areas 
(e.g. time-share, consumer credit, investor protection, and more generally unfair 
contract terms).  
 
                                                 
70   See ECJ Case 150/77 – Bertrand, ECR 1978, 1431 N 17 ff.; ECJ Case C-269/95 – Benincasa, ECR 
1997 I-3767 N 13; both on the restrictive interpretation of Art. 13, 14 of the 1968 Brussels 
Convention; see as well on the consumer concept in the Directives ECJ Case C-361/89 – Di Pinto, 
ECR 1991 I-1189 N 15-19; ECJ Case C-45/96 – Dietzinger, ECR 1998 I-1199; On the restrictive 
interpretation Art. 5 Rome Convention = Art. 29 EGBGB see the German FCJ in: BGHZ 135, 124 
(133 ff.). 
71   BGHZ 135, 124 
72   BGHZ 135, 124 
73   BGHZ 123, 124 
74   See Magnus, in: STAUDINGER (2002), Art. 29 EGBGB N 45 ff.; Heiss, in: CZERNICH/HEISS, EVÜ, 
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Problems do not only arise in the context of financial services where e.g. the provi-
sion of individual investment advice or management clearly constitutes a service 
within the meaning of Art. 5( 1 ), whereas the same service could be easily trans-
formed into a financial “product” (say, a structured bond or a share in a special 
purpose vehicle or investment fund), the transfer of which would not be covered. 
Just as unclear is the status of contracts on the pure lease of movable goods (i.e. 
without an option on the future transfer of property) and, furthermore, the licens-
ing of the use of intellectual property like software, information, music, videos and 
other  content,  which  is  about  to  become  very  common  in  the  context  of  E-
Commerce, where even so-called E-Books are no longer sold in terms of a transfer 
of property.75 
 
It  is  suggested,  therefore,  to  extend  the  definition  of  consumer  contracts.  The 
GEDIP proposes Art. 5 being applicable to all contracts “the object of which is the 
supply of property, whether movable or immovable, or of services to a person”76. This defi-
nition, however, might not solve the problems with shares, lease, licensing, and 
financial services. Another venue could be to extend Art. 5 ( 1 ) to every contract in 
accordance with the revised Art. 15 ( 1 ) c of the Brussels I Regulation, which reads 
as follows: “In matters relating to a contract concluded by a person, the consumer, for a 
purpose which can be regarded as being outside his trade or profession, jurisdiction shall be 
determined by this Section, … , if: … (c) in all other cases, the contract has been concluded 
with a person who pursues commercial or professional activities in the Member State of the 
consumers domicile or, by any means, directs such activities to that Member State or to 
several States including that Member State, and the contract falls within the scope of such 
activities.”77 This solution is surely preferable, since there is the same public interest 
in applying the mandatory rules of the consumer country with regard to all existing 
and future consumer protection rules. If there really is a need for exceptions, with 
regard to e.g. transportation contracts in the light of existing international conven-
tions (See Art. 15 (3) Brussels I Regulation), or in view of special rules concerning 
insurance contracts, these should be made explicitly in order to make it clear that 
the burden of reason giving for an exception lies with the person suggesting such 
exceptions. Prima facie, however, there are good reasons for all consumer contracts 
being covered. 
                                                 
75   See e.g. the terms and conditions of www.Amazon.com for E-Books, where only limited rights of 
use (personalised on screen reading, making a certain amount of hard copies) are transferred to 
the “buyer”, which is technically ensured by a personally registered software (e.g. Acrobat E-
Book Reader). 
76   Accessible at http://www.drt.ucl.ac.be/gedip 
77   See supra note 55, text available at 
http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=EN&n
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There are two qualifications, however, which have to be made with regard to the 
concept of the consumer contract: (a) Consumer protection in contract law is legiti-
mised by the fact of an imbalance between the parties, i.e. the consumer being the 
weaker party as compared to a party acting within its trade or profession. The con-
sumer protection directives, therefore, do apply only to contracts between a busi-
ness and a consumer. This is as well the position taken in Art. 15 ( 1 ) c Brussels I 
Regulation. In terms of a coherent European contract law, a single concept of the 
consumer contract should be used, being defined by a common frame of reference, 
unless good reasons to do otherwise are provided. It follows, that Art. 5( 1 ) should 
apply to business-to-consumer transactions only, as suggested as well by the GEDIP. 
 
Furthermore, there is another qualification inherent to consumer protection: (b) A 
consumer is per definition acting on the demand side of a market.78 For a person 
offering goods or services – even when acting outside its trade or profession – is not 
consuming, but acts in the role of a supplier and, in case of the supply of services, 
as an employee (Art. 6 Rome Convention). Art. 5( 1 ) Rome Convention, therefore, 
defines a consumer contract as “… a contract the object of which is the supply of 
goods or service to a person (‘the consumer’) …”. This is made clear as well in the 
proposition  of  the  GEDIP79  and  also  in  the  Community  directives  on  consumer 
protection, which cover business-to-consumer transactions, but not vice versa.80 It 
                                                 
78   See Reich, BÜRGERRECHTE IN DER EU, 1999, p. 262: „Unter Verbraucher wird … jeder 
Unionsbürger verstanden, der auf dem Binnenmarkt für Waren- und Dienstleistungen als 
Nachfrager auftritt und damit seine persönlichen Bedarfe befriedigen will.“ 
79   See supra note 76: „supply … to a person“ 
80   See Art. 1(1) Directive 85/577/EEC on contracts concluded away from business premises, see 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/door_sell/index_en.htm: 
“contracts under which a trader supplies goods or services to a consumer”; Art. 1(2) c) Con-
sumer Credit Directive (87/102/EEC) as amended, see the overview on the issue including the 
proposol for reform at: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/consumers/cons_int/fina_serv/cons_directive/index_en.htm: 
“' credit agreement'  means an agreement whereby a creditor grants or promises to grant to a 
consumer a credit” (= Art. 2(c) of the reform proposal); Art. 2(1) Distance Selling Directive 
(97/7/EC), see 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/dist_sell/index_en.htm: 
“' distance contract`  means any contract concerning goods or services concluded between a 
supplier and a consumer under an organized distance sales or service-provision scheme run by 
the supplier”; Art. 1(1) Unfair Contract Terms Directive (93/13/EEC), see 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/unf_cont_terms/index_en.htm: 
“contracts concluded between a seller or supplier and a consumer”; Art. 2(1) in connection with 
Art. 1(2) a) - c) of the Consumer Sales Directive (1999/44/EC), see 
http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&n
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follows, that in a consumer contract as a general rule the consumer is supplied with 
something (usually defined as a good or service) by a business in exchange for a 
consideration (including, but not limited to money).81 
 
However, this fact is not made clear by Art. 15( 1 ) c of the Brussels I Regulation as 
quoted above in paragraph [31]. On the other hand, the current use of the term 
“supply with goods or services” and even the proposed term “supply with prop-
erty or services” (GEDIP) has turned out to be too narrow to cover all mandatory 
consumer contract provisions. As a possible solution to this problem, the concept of 
the “characteristic performance”, which is already well established in Art. 4(2) could 
be used in a future definition of “the consumer contract” in Art. 5( 1 ) Rome Con-
vention, but as well in the “Common Frame of Reference”. A respective proposition 
of such a definition is provided later in this paper (see section E.). 
 
 
bb) The revision of the concept of the “passive” consumer in Art. 5(2) 
 
As indicated above, the concept of the passive consumer is held to be insufficient 
today for a variety of reasons. The Green Paper here presents a set of solutions, 
which is very difficult to understand and, thus, to comment on, since the different 
reasons for an amendment of Art. 5(2) are not clearly separated. There are three 
distinct problems, which have to be addressed by a reform: 1) On the one hand, the 
active consumer should be guaranteed the mandatory protection of the EC-acquis in 
cases closely connected to the internal market. 2) On the other hand, the protection 
of the passive consumer by the mandatory rules of the country of her habitual resi-
dence is questionable, where the law otherwise applicable is the law of another 
Member state of the EC or EEA, and both laws are with regard to the protection 
rules at issue minimum harmonised by EC-Directives. 3) Finally, the current dis-
tinction between the active and passive consumer is not clear cut in the context of 
cross-border B2C-E-Commerce. A solution here should enhance consumer trust by 
providing a sufficient degree of protection, while at the same time enabling EU-
                                                 
81   The consideration offered by the consumer must – of course – not be a adequate. However, there 
is no need for contractual consumer protection in case of a gratuitous promise of a business. The 
scope of this concept is best described by the term “entgeltliche Leistung” (something like: 
performance in exchange for a (i.e. any) consideration) used in section 312(1) German Civil Code 
(the “BGB”) with regard to door-step selling. The problem of a contract without consideration 
was addressed as well in ECJ Case C-45/96 – Dietzinger, ECR 1998, I-1199, where the ECJ ruled 
that the Door-Step-Selling Directive 85/577/EEC is applicable to a guarantee, although the 
guarantor receives no consideration himself, since the guarantee is connected to the credit 
agreement and the creditor provides a service (credit) to a third party (the debtor). However, 
according to the ECJ the credit agreement itself must be a consumer credit in order for the 
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wide distribution strategies in order to ensure, that the right of consumers to access 
the European markets is not limited by the reluctance of SMEs to deal with con-
sumers under 25 different protection regimes.82 
 
All three problems have in common, that the fact of the emergence of a new, supra-
national level of contract law, which was not yet existent when the Rome Conven-
tion was drafted, has to be reflected. In the context of the European contract law 
acquis, the concept of the application of the law of the country of the consumers 
habitual residence seems to be somewhat outdated. It was often said, that the con-
sumer “trusts” in the application of the protection rules of his home state, but it was 
certainly never true that the consumer would know that law. Otherwise, the quite 
excessive obligations on the seller, supplier etc. to provide information with regard 
to  applying  consumer  protection  measures,  especially  as  regards  cancellation 
rights, would have been superfluous. It is true, however, that the consumer may 
have developed some kind of generalised expectation of being treated fairly by the 
law and the courts of her home-state. It follows, that consumers, while having no 
specific interest in the application of their home-state law, in fact do have a more 
general interest in being afforded a sufficient level of protection. Thus, if being in-
formed in advance that there is a right to cancellation within a certain period ac-
cording to, lets say, English law, the application of such law is absolutely fine with 
the consumer, even if the period under his home-state law would be three days 
longer. However, this is somewhat more complicated for the already mentioned 
“travelling” or “active” consumer: it may come to her as a bad surprise when a 
contract made while travelling somewhere through Europe were to be subjected by 
the terms of the contract to the law of a third state, if this state’s law either did not 
provide for any protection or for a lower level of protection as e.g. in the Isle-of-
Man  cases  mentioned  above.  This  is  especially  irritating  when  and  where  such 
choice of law clauses are effectively “hidden” in the general terms and conditions of 
the  contract.  Finally,  the  consumer  has  potentially  no  interest  in  the  mandatory 
application of his home-state law, if this would result in a refusal to deal with the 
consumer by businesses which are not prepared to adopt a specific legal distribu-
tion policy under the law of the state of the consumer and, therefore, prefer not to 
enter into contracts with consumers from certain states. This is especially true if the 
business would be prepared to deal with the consumer under another law which in 
turn provides for a sufficient degree of consumer protection. To sum up it can be 
said that the consumer has a legitimate interest in not being deprived of the high 
level of protection afforded to him by the European consumer protection acquis, i.e. 
                                                 
82   All three problems are implicitly adressed by the solutions proposed by the Grenn Paper at 
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there is a legitimate interest in the application of the law of a Member State, which 
is not necessarily the state of the habitual residence of the consumer.83 
 
In addition, a full scale analysis of the proposals with regard to a reform of Art. 5 
Rome Convention has to reflect on the legitimate interests of the involved busi-
nesses. Here two things seem to be essential. On the one hand, as for the consumer, 
there may be some interest in the application of the law of the home-state of the 
business. But that is not of overall importance. Under Art. 4(2) sentence 2 Rome 
Convention the home-state of a business is the country where the place of business 
which under the contract is obliged to effect the characteristic performance is situ-
ated. It follows,  that a business with its principal place of business in  England, 
which maintains additional places of business abroad, has more than one home 
state and, thus, under the home-state principal is – except for a choice of law, which 
under the current regime of Art. 5 Rome Convention is limited in effect – not able to 
follow  a  uniform  distribution  strategy  under  a  single  legal  regime.  In  terms  of 
transaction costs of cross-border trade, however, the latter would be the most fa-
vourable solution to the business. As a result it can be said, that businesses have 
predominantly a legitimate interest in the application of a single legal regime, but 
not necessarily the one of the home-state in terms of the principal place of business. 
On the other hand, certainty with regard to the applicable law is of great impor-
tance. For a business will be able to make an informed decision about where and 
with whom to deal, to set up prices according to involved legal risks, and to con-
form with potential information obligations only if the legal regime applicable to a 
transaction is definite from the outset. With regard to consumer contracts the busi-
ness should thus be able to know in advance whether or not a transaction consti-
tutes a consumer contract, where the habitual residence of the consumer is located, 
and whether or not the law of the consumer-state will be applicable.  
 
Under the regime of the current Art. 5 Rome Convention, however, none of these 
issues is clear to the business. Whereas according to Art. 2 a) CISG the Convention 
does not apply to consumer sales, “unless the seller, at any time before or at the time of 
the conclusion of the contract, neither knew nor ought to have known that the goods were 
bought for” private use, Art. 5( 1 ) Rome Convention leaves this question open.84 The 
                                                 
83   See Reich/Nordhausen, VERBRAUCHER UND RECHT IM ELEKTRONISCHEN GESCHÄFTSVERKEHR, 
2000, which propose to generally apply the acquis of the European consumer protection 
directives as the “mandatory law of the forum” instead of the law of the consumers’ home-state. 
See as well Grundmann, Binnenmarktkollisionsrecht - vom klassischen IPR zur 
Integrationsordnung, RABELSZ 69 (2000) 457-477, proposing the application of the business’ 
home-state law in combination with a direct application of the acquis, where necessary. 
84   Art. 5 Rome Convention is interpreted by many authors in the light of the solution of Art. 2 a) 
CISG (see hereto Ferrari, in: Schlechtriem (ed.), CISG-KOMMENTAR, 3rd ed. 2000, Art 2 N. 15 ff.), 
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same is true for the question, whether or not the business could have known the 
country  of  the  consumer’s  habitual  residence.  This  is  an  issue  typically  arising 
within the context of direct E-Commerce, i.e. where digitised products or services 
(e.g. information, software, music, videos etc.) are delivered on-line.85 Finally, the 
circumstances under which a consumer can be regarded as passive and thus the 
mandatory rules of the law of the consumer-state are applicable according to Art. 
5(2)  are  very  complex,  especially  with  regard  to  E-Commerce  transactions.  It  is 
highly controversial, for instance, if the mere fact of the potential global presence of 
a website of a business domiciled e.g. in Greece constitutes an advertising in the 
state of e.g. a German consumer under Art. 5(2) indent 1 Rome Convention.86 If Art. 
5(2) applies, the business has no interest in a choice of its home-state law, since this 
would result in dépeçage, i.e. the cumulative application of the protection rules of 
the consumer’s and the business’ home-state.87 
 
Thus, the solution to all three problems would be to allow for a single law, govern-
ing cross-border consumer contracts on a sufficiently high level of consumer pro-
tection. In the context of E-Commerce this argument runs in favour of a world-wide 
solution. Since a world consumer contract law seems to be not a very realistic op-
tion,  however,  within  the  limits  of  its  competencies  the  Commission  could  and 
should at least provide for a solution for the internal market, allowing for uniform 
distribution strategies on a EU-wide level. A European solution would be favour-
able as well for businesses from third states. From the transaction cost perspective 
                                                                                                                             
see Magnus, in: STAUDINGER (2002), Art. 29 EGBGB N. 38; Heiss, in: Czernich/Heiss, EVÜ, Art. 5 
N. 8; Glatt, INTERNETVERTRÄGE, 2002, p. 105-109; Foss/Bygrave, International Consumer Pur-
chases Trough the Internet, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF LAW AND IT 2000 8(99). However, this 
interpretation is contested and not yet supported by precedence. 
85   See e.g. Fallenböck, INTERNET UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT, 2001, at 61 (commenting on 
the solution of the UCITA), and 107; see as well Nimmer, Through the Looking Glass: What 
Courts and UCITA Say About the Scope of Contract Law in the Information Age, 38 DUQ. L. 
REV. (2000) 255, 262 ff.; Art. 109 b) UCITA 2002 reads as follows: (1) An access contract or a 
contract providing for electronic delivery of a copy is governed by the law of the jurisdiction in 
which the licensor was located when the agreement was entered into. (2) A consumer contract 
that requires delivery of a copy on a tangible medium is governed by the law of the jurisdiction 
in which the copy is or should have been delivered to the consumer. 
86   See Magnus, in: STAUDINGER (2002), Art. 28 EGBGB Note 653-655; Glatt, VERTRAGSSCHLUSS IM 
INTERNET, 2002, p. 123 ff.; Maack, DIE DURCHSETZUNG DES AGB-RECHTLICHEN 
TRANSPARENZGEBOTS IN INTERNATIONALEN VERBRAUCHERVERTRÄGEN, 2001, p. 155 ff., 186; 
Reich/Nordhausen, VERBRAUCHER UND RECHT IM ELEKTRONISCHEN GESCHÄFTSVERKEHR, 2000 at 
86 ff. 
87   See only Heiss, RABELSZ 2001, 634 ff., 650: „Wo Art. 5 EVÜ greift, will er [der Unternehmer, 
GPC] überhaupt keine Rechtswahl, zumal sie ihn nur belasten kann.“ (Where Art. 5 is 
applicable, the business does not want a choice of law, since it will result to the detriment of the 
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the implementation of a distinct, but single European marketing strategy would 
pay off even for SMEs, since it would provide access to a market of about 480 mil-
lion consumers.88  
 
 
D. The Future of European Contract Law: Three Scenarios 
 
Since for the time being, there is no European contract law regime, which would 
qualify as a legal system autonomously governing cross-border consumer transac-
tions, the question addressed by the Action Plan and the Green Paper is, which 
strategy the Community should follow in order to reach a solution. And indeed, in 
this perspective both projects are closely interrelated, since the reform of the Rome 
Convention cannot be addressed without knowing, where the European contract 
law project is heading for. The following section shall give a brief presentation of 
three different scenarios of future development which are implied in the Action 
Plan and Green Paper. 
 
 
1. The best of all worlds: an optional instrument 
 
The best solution would be an optional European Contract Code, covering not only 
contract law but as well the related questions of transfer of and securities in prop-
erty and the law of unjust enrichment. Such a European Contract Code could be 
implemented as a Community Regulation, which would apply to all international 
contracts, but like the CISG the Code would allow for an opt-out in international 
situations, and in addition for an opt-in in purely national situations by means of 
choice of law. Such a Code would, of course, provide for a high level of consumer 
protection, thereby rendering unnecessary a decision on the difficult questions of 
applicable law under the international contract law regime of the Rome Conven-
tion. However, this would only be true for cross-border contracts in pure internal 
market cases. The Rome Convention, especially Art. 5, would still have to provide 
rules on the law applicable in international situations with a connection to a third, 
non-EU state, on the one hand, and on the applicable law in case of the parties opt-
ing-out of the Code, on the other. In the latter case, e.g. if an English company sells 
to a German consumer under a choice of English law, the current Regime of Art. 5, 
probably as amended to reflect the changes in Art. 15 of the Brussels I Regulation, 
would apply.  
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A clear-cut distinction between a European Civil Code and national private laws 
would not only allow for coherence and consistency on both levels, but as well for a 
workable competition of private laws. Once  a European regulation would come 
into force, there is no longer any legitimation for the European harmonisation di-
rectives, because all cases relevant to the functioning of the internal market were 
covered by the regulation. Thus, the national private law legislators would be able 
again, to follow an autonomous strategy in the development of their private laws 
without the constant risk of being voided by the ECJ. The current minimum har-
monisation approach, on the opposite, led to a situation well known as a fallacy of 
federalism: the distribution of competencies between different political levels, where 
neither the European Community nor the Member States are able to follow a coher-
ent concept in private law legislation, constitutes a situation often described as “or-
ganised irresponsibility”.89 
 
As indicated above, the current interplay of the harmonisation directives with Art. 
5 Rome Convention could be justified in the light of the basic freedoms only if the 
resulting impediments to the free movement of goods and services in the internal 
market were proportionate with regard to the aim of these measures. Art. 95 EC-
Treaty constitutes a Community competency only where harmonisation is neces-
sary for the completion of the internal market. Since the passive consumer under 
Art. 5 Rome Convention is protected by the mandatory rules of her home-state, the 
harmonisation directives currently can be legitimised only with regard to the active 
consumer in the internal market. However, the harmonisation measures have to be 
transposed into the Member States’ general private law, thus prescribing a certain 
level of consumer protection both in purely national cases and in those cases obvi-
ously involving the “passive” consumer. But the “active” consumer, as addressed 
by the Community directives, somehow remains a “chimera”:90 that is to say that 
approximately 99 per cent of all consumer contracts are purely national or con-
cluded by passive consumers.91 The Community can, thus, be regarded as being 
                                                 
89   For the use of that term see generally Beck, GEGENGIFTE – DIE ORGANISIERTE 
UNVERANTWORTLICHKEIT, 1988; in the context of private law legislation see only Safferling, 
supra note 58. 
90   I.e. an illusion or fabrication of the mind or fancy. This term was used by Christian Joerges at the 
May 2002 Conference of SECOLA in London, in this context indicating that the “active 
consumer” is a fabrication of the Commission in order to annex competencies in consumer 
protection law. 
91   According to a survey of the European Mail Order and Distance Selling Trade Association 
(EMOTA) of 30.09.2002 (www.emota-aevpc.org/) this is true even for distance selling: „Sales to 
consumers in other states directly across borders are still insignificant (no more than 3%) as a 
part of total sales due to existing barriers. Companies prefer to work together with or acquire a 
local firm in order to profit from their knowledge of the local market, consumer attitude and in-
terpretation of local legislation („think international, act local“).“ 2003]                                                                                                                                     359  Coherence and Consistency 
involved in an activity of trying to shoot birds with canons). In other words, the 
question of proportionality arises where, for example, the Consumer Sales Directive 
results in a full scale reform of German sales contract law, only because this law is 
applicable in less than one per cent of the transactions covered92 as well to some 
tourists or other active consumers from the EU.  
 
This fact is – of course – not openly addressed by the Consumer Sales Directive, 
which reads as follows:93 “(2) Whereas the internal market comprises an area without 
internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is 
guaranteed; whereas free movement of goods concerns not only transactions by persons 
acting in the course of a business but also transactions by private individuals; whereas it 
implies that consumers resident in one Member State should be free to purchase goods in the 
territory of another Member State on the basis of a uniform minimum set of fair rules 
governing  the  sale  of  consumer  goods;  (3)  Whereas  the  laws  of  the  Member  States 
concerning the sale of consumer goods are somewhat disparate, with the result that national 
consumer goods markets differ from one another and that competition between sellers may 
be  distorted;  (4)  Whereas  consumers  who  are  keen  to  benefit  from  the  large  market  by 
purchasing goods in Member States other than their State of residence play a fundamental 
role  in  the  completion  of  the  internal  market;  whereas  the  artificial  reconstruction  of 
frontiers  and  the  compartmentalisation  of  markets  should  be  prevented;  whereas  the 
opportunities available to consumers have been greatly broadened by new communication 
technologies which allow ready access to distribution systems in other Member States or in 
third countries; whereas, in the absence of minimum harmonisation of the rules governing 
the sale of consumer goods, the development of the sale of goods through the medium of new 
distance communication technologies risks being impeded; ( 5 ) Whereas the creation of a 
common set of minimum rules of consumer law, valid no matter where goods are purchased 
within the Community, will strengthen consumer confidence and enable consumers to make 
the most of the internal market; …”  
 
On the background of the described extent of Art. 5 Rome Convention these con-
siderations are nothing other than a set of meaningless common places combined 
with  purposefully  construed  misdirections  in  order  to  fabric  a  competence  for  har-
                                                 
92   It has to be taken into account, that a transformation of the Consumer Sales Directive 
(1999/44/EC) limited to consumer contracts would have led to an unbearable fragmentation of 
the German civil law codification “BGB”. Therefore, the German legislator decided to reform the 
general sales contract provisions in the BGB, which apply as well to consumer-to-consumer and 
business-to-business transactions. Thus the active consumer contracts, the regulation of which 
the Directive is heading for (see considerations 2-5 of the Directive), account for far less then one 
per cent of all covered transactions. 
93   Directive 1999/44/EC: 
http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&n
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monisation under Art. 95 EC-Treaty where in fact there is none. In almost every 
described  cross-border  consumer  transaction,  especially  those  involving  cross-
border E-Commerce, the mandatory laws of the country of the consumers habitual 
residence do apply under Art. 5 Rome Convention. It follows, that consumer trust 
in cross-border transactions cannot be enhanced by a harmonisation of mandatory 
consumer protection rules of the private laws of other Member States, which will 
not  be  applicable anyway  (except,  of  course,  for  the  rare  case  of  an  active  con-
sumer).94 
 
There are two solutions to this fundamental problem. Either the European Commu-
nity limits the unproportionally broad side-effects of its measures on the Member 
States’ private laws in order to target only the problems specific to the internal 
market (i.e. currently only the active consumer). Or the Community broadens the 
legitimate scope of its harmonisation measures by providing for mutual recognition 
of the Member States’ private laws at least in the harmonised fields. That is to say, if 
the extent to which the consumer-state principle under Art. 5 of the Rome Convention ap-
plies is limited, the legitimation of harmonisation measures under Art. 95 EC-Treaty is 
broadened respectively, and vice versa. A third solution would be to transfer the gen-
eral competence for (at least the economically relevant) private law legislation from 
the Member States to the Community level. However, that solution would make 
necessary an amendment of the EC-Treaty and, moreover, may not be in accor-
dance with the principle of subsidiarity. 
 
A European optional instrument would, however, combine the first and second solu-
tion. As opposed to the harmonisation directives it would in no way interfere with 
the Member States competencies in private law legislation, except for providing an 
alternative contract law regime, which the parties of cross-border contracts may 
choose (by means of not opting out) in order to circumvent the impediments to the 
basic freedoms resulting from the complex fragmentation of Member States’ private 
laws, especially with a view to mandatory consumer protection rules. At the same 
time the consumer-state principle of Art. 5 Rome Convention would not be appli-
cable, where a contract is governed by the European code. Thus, the legitimate ef-
fect  of  a  European  optional  code  would  be  broader  than  that  of  harmonisation 
measures  (i.e.  including  all  cross-border  consumer  contracts,  irrespective  of  the 
consumer being active or passive) and at the same time much more target specific 
with regard to side-effects (i.e. excluding purely national situations, unless parties 
opt-in, which would strengthen party autonomy and be a necessity under the prin-
ciple of equality in order to prevent the phenomenon of domestic trade discrimina-
tion). 
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Another advantage of an optional code is, that it would allow for a competition 
between different private law regimes. This would – of course – not be a complete 
competition between the law of the Member States and the optional code on a level 
playing field. With regard to consumer contracts under national private law, the 
current or reformed regime of Art. 5 Rome convention would continue to apply. 
However, it would be left to the business to decide, if it prefers to deal under the 
current regime of national private law in combination with the mandatory rules of 
the country of the consumer’s habitual residence, or under the uniform regime of 
the European optional code. 
 
As a result it can be said, that the Commission should focus all available capacities 
on the drafting of an European optional code while wasting no more time with 
further harmonisation measures, which at the point when the optional instrument 
enters into force should be abandoned . This would  ensure the Member States’ full 
responsibility and sovereignty in the area of purely internal private law legislation 
in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity. 
 
 
2. The worst case scenario: proliferation of harmonisation without mutual recog-
nition 
 
The argumentation followed in this paper is not new. Similar concerns have repeti-
tively been raised by learned private law scholars, and – in addition – were already 
compiled  and  consolidated  by  many  contributions  responding  to  the  July  2001 
Communication on European Contract Law. But, in light of the compelling force of 
the arguments made in favour of an optional code, the conclusions drawn by the 
Commission from the consultation process are somewhat surprising. Of course, the 
Commission is right in putting a European Civil Code of the agenda, where that 
term would indicate a uniform law replacing national private laws. But, although 
the Commission is intending to continue reflections on an optional instrument, the 
combination  of  such  reflections  with  further  harmonisation  and,  moreover,  the 
literal  “harmonisation  of harmonisation”  measures must  be  seen  as  utterly mis-
guided. This is not only true in terms of priorities, where the focus on further har-
monisation is as a matter of capacities certainly delaying the drafting of an optional 
code. The concern with this combined approach is more fundamental. 
 
According to the principle of the rule of law, laws should not only be coherent and 
consistent, but also relatively stable, i.e. “they should not be changed to often”.95 
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This is true also from an economic perspective, since every change in private law 
legislation leads to tremendous costs, especially in the private sector, where mar-
keting  strategies,  general  business  terms  and  conditions,  and  compliance  proce-
dures have to be adapted. The sector specific approach of the European harmonisa-
tion measures during the Nineties did lead to a troubling proliferation of directives 
which transformed the character of national private law legislation, once dedicated 
to  the  idea  of  codification,  into  a  continuous  work  in  progress.  This  problem  was 
stressed e.g. by the joint response of the Lando-Commission an the Study Group: 
“The quality of private law in the EU can only be significantly improved if the pre-
sent sector-specific approach … is overcome.”96 Thus one can rightly wonder, what 
inspired the Commission in its Action Plan to the statement that “none of the con-
tributions indicated that the sectoral approach as such leads to problems or that it 
should be abandoned.”97  
 
It follows, that the intention of the Commission to improve the quality and modern-
ise the existing acquis, and to continue to put forward new sector-specific proposals 
(see supra para. 16-17) should be subjected to a thorough cost-benefit analysis. The 
relatively little advantages of a consolidation of the acquis in order to tackle small-
scale sector-specific inconsistencies by means of new minimum harmonisation direc-
tives, which for their inherent necessity of discretionary transposition by national 
legislators  would  not  ensure  overall  consistency  anyways,  have  to  be  weighed 
against  the  disadvantages  resulting  from  the  need  for  continuing  large-scale 
changes and adaptations in the Member States’ private laws and the related private 
sector  costs.  Coherence  in  European  contract  law  cannot  be  achieved  by  an  ap-
proach heading for “more of the same”.  Harmonising the patchwork acquis by means 
of harmonisation directives amounts to a strategy of replacing one evil with an-
other.98 
 
The Action Plan indicates that the Commission understands the improvement and 
modernisation of the acquis as part of an overall strategy that is embedded in the 
drafting of the Common Frame of Reference and intended to lead in the long run to 
a  coherent  European  contract  law,  codified  in  a  potential  optional  instrument. 
However, the continued release of harmonisation directives, especially if combined 
with a switch from minimum to full harmonisation (see supra para. 17), will lead to 
an increasing uniformisation of the national private law systems without any limita-
                                                 
96   See von Bar/Lando/Swann, Communication on European Contract Law: Joint Response of the 
Commission on European Contract Law and the Study Group on a European Civil Code, ERPL 
2002, 182, 230 (paragraph 84). 
97   See Action Plan COM(2003) 68 final, Paragraph 14. 
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tion to cross-border transactions. This approach would, therefore, only be consis-
tent within an overall strategy, which is heading for a uniform European Civil Code 
replacing the national laws. But this is not the intention of the Commission (see su-
pra para. 13). The Action Plan is promoting an optional instrument as long-term 
solution instead. Since an optional code for internal market cross-border transac-
tions – as has been shown above – is not relying on the harmonisation of the Mem-
ber States’ private laws, there is an inconsistency between the short- and long-term 
measures proposed by the Action Plan. 
 
Finally, in its Green Paper the Commission suggests that the scope of Art. 5 Rome 
Convention is likely to be extended in order to cover all kinds of contracts. This is 
apparently done to clarify that consumers in cross-border B2C-E-Commerce trans-
actions are protected as “passive” consumers and also to protect the active con-
sumer who is deliberately shopping throughout the internal market. The Action 
Plan, however, leaves the question of mutual recognition in harmonised areas un-
addressed, and the Green Paper is very vague in this respect.99 Both Communica-
tions together, therefore, raise the fundamental concern, that in a worst case scenario 
a  continually  condensed  private law  harmonisation  could  be  combined  with  an 
extension of the country-of-destination approach in Art. 5 Rome Convention. The 
Commission’s  reluctance  to  acknowledge  and  address  the  intrinsic  interrelation 
between the consumer directives and the corresponding conflict rules may thus 
lead to a situation where the Commission deprives itself, by means of the enact-
ment of a Rome I Regulation, of the – already very thin – legitimation basis for fur-
ther harmonisation measures under Art. 95 EC-Treaty. 
 
 
3. A Constitutional Framework for the Competition of Private Laws 
 
If the best solution to the problems of European contract law, i.e. an optional code, 
is obviously far from being available in the near future, the question arises if there 
is a second-best solution which is, however, not necessarily the one literally most 
similar to the best solution (the so-called second-best problem). The alternative to a 
uniform consumer contract law established by an European optional instrument is, 
in fact, to follow the country-of-origin approach, i.e. the policy of minimum har-
monisation in combination with mutual recognition, which is inherent to the ECJ 
adjudication  on  the  basic  freedoms  and  which  was  successfully  adopted  by  the 
Commission in its 1985 strategy for the completion of the internal market.  
                                                 
99   The Green Paper in ist introduction simply states: „ The present document does not intend to 
examine the relationship between a possible future instrument and the Internal Market rules. 
For the Commission it is clear, however, that such an instrument should leave intact the 
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This  solution  allows  businesses  to establish  uniform  marketing  and  distribution 
schemes throughout the internal market on the basis of the home-state principle, i.e. 
by EU-wide application of the law of the country where its principal place of busi-
ness is situated. From the point of view of the business, the economies of scale real-
ised by legal standardisation effects are equal to the effects of a uniform optional 
instrument. However, the consumer would then have to deal under 25 different 
private laws. That might not be of much concern, since even the consumer under 
the consumer-state principle is currently not able to realise standardisation effects, 
because he usually is not a repeat player effectively employing general terms and 
conditions. In addition, the consumer can regularly not be expected to “know the 
law”, including her home-state law. He is protected by harmonisation measures 
guaranteeing a high level of consumer protection under all Member States’ private 
laws,  and  moreover  by  information  obligations  with  regard  to  consumer  rights 
afforded to him by the applicable law. 
 
There are, however, some serious disadvantages resulting from this second best 
solution. Among others these are the broad side-effects of harmonisation measures 
with regard to purely national cases; for one, there is the high risk of inconsistencies 
inherent to the concept of the Directive that has to be transposed by national legis-
lators and that makes it so difficult for the ECJ to guarantee a uniform application 
throughout the EU; furthermore, there is the inconsistency of the harmonisation 
approach with the long-term aim of an optional instrument; and last but not least 
there  is  the  resulting  difference  between  consumer-state  jurisdiction  (Art.  15  ff. 
Brussels I Regulation) and the application of business’ home-state law, where real 
judges are neither educated nor willing to apply foreign private law,100 and the 
courts are not equipped for that task as a matter of day-to-day business – in stark 
contrast to what we are made to believe when reading the average “conflicts of 
law” text book. That is to say, here again there is a need for a thorough cost-benefit 
analysis, where the advantages of the often praised competition of systems or juris-
dictions – if workable in the area of contract law at all101 – have to be weighed 
against the enormous legal transaction costs and the decrease in certainty resulting 
from the idea of an EU-wide ubiquitous and simultaneous application of 25 differ-
ent private laws. Judges regularly are fully occupied with a diligent application of 
                                                 
100   In the Isle-of-Man Case decided by the FCJ (BGHZ 135, , 124), for instance, the lower Courts had 
not even tried to solve the case under the laws of the Isle-of-Man. The whole argument was just 
about the applicability of the German protection rules. Thus, the FCJ in its decission simply 
presumed, that the contract would be enforceable under the law of the Isle-of-Man (at II 2 and 3). 
101   For a very good analysis and a sceptical result with regard to the prerequisites of a competition 
in  both mandatory as well as dispositive private law see Kieninger, WETTBEWERB DER 
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their own country’s law already. To transform the application of foreign private 
law from an exception into a regular case would end up in making legal dilettantism 
a principle and fundament of the European judicial area. 
 
However, as long as the Commission holds on to its sector-specific harmonisation 
approach and continues in its intention to tackle the described fallacies of that ap-
proach by a “more of the same”-strategy, one should make the best out of it, and 
that is to provide for a constitutional framework, i.e. principles of conflicts of law 
which help constitute an “European system of private laws”.102 As has convincingly 
been argued by Stefan Grundmann in such a system there are three kinds of norms 
to be differentiated on the substantive contract law plane: substantive mandatory 
law prescribing a certain content of contracts; information obligations which,  al-
though mandatory do not prescribe a certain content and, while tackling the prob-
lem of information asymmetries, are rather facilitative in nature; and, finally, the 
so-called dispositive law which, although it might receive a quasi-mandatory status 
within the context of judicial control over standardised contract forms, is generally 
providing for a standard content of contracts only where the parties did not agree 
otherwise. 
 
Grundmann suggests that in a European system of contract laws there should be full 
harmonisation on the European level with regard to information obligations, which 
make up the core of the European contract law acquis today,103 since these rules on 
the one hand do  not  substantially interfere with party autonomy, while, on the 
other, it is, in fact, very difficult for businesses to comply with a fragmented system 
of only minimum harmonised information obligations. This argument is supported 
by the above discussed example of the divergences in the length and calculation of 
cooling-off  periods  and  respective  information  obligations.  The  intention  of  the 
Commission to bring consistency to this area of consumer protection by means of 
full harmonisation measures is, thus, completely in line with this argumentation. 
 
Mandatory content rules, however, do substantially interfere with party autonomy. 
At the end of the day, a uniform European solution would bear the risk of inflexi-
bility and cementation of “single just solutions”, which might turn out as economi-
cally inefficient or even detrimental to consumers.104 Such rules should, therefore, 
                                                 
102   See for the following ideas Grundmann (supra note 13), especially in RIW 2002. 
103   See Grundmann, Europäisches Verbrauchervertragsrecht im Spiegel der ökonomischen Theorie 
– Vertragsinformationsrecht im Binnenmarkt, in: Ott/Schäfer (ed.), VEREINHEITLICHUNG UND 
DIVERSITÄT DES ZIVILRECHTS IN TRANSNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFTSRÄUMEN, 2002, 284 ff. 
104   See for potential inverse effects of consumer protection only: Joerges, VERBRAUCHERSCHUTZ ALS 
RECHTSPROBLEM, 1981, p. 127; Schäfer, in: Grundmann (ed.), SYSTEMBILDUNG UND 
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only be minimum harmonised on the European level, while the Member States’ could 
provide  different  solutions  of  higher  protection.  However,  with  regard  to  these 
Member State rules the home-state principle should apply in order to ensure competi-
tion as a discovery process with regard to the most efficient solution, but only within 
the framework of European minimum harmonisation. 
 
Finally, with regard to the dispositives contract rules there should be full competi-
tion. In contrast, Grundmann suggests that the Commission might offer an addi-
tional dispositive framework for party autonomy by means of an optional instru-
ment. This limited competition is of course already provided for by means of choice 
of law under Art. 3 Rome Convention which is not limited under Art 5 of the Con-
vention with regard to non-mandatory law. 
 
 
E: A Common Frame of Reference: Some Propositions 
 
When taking into account the intentions of the Commission expressed in the Action 
Plan and its Green Paper, the third scenario is obviously the one most likely to be 
realised in a short and middle-term perspective. Therefore, in the following some 
propositions shall be made with regard to a definition of the consumer contract as part 
of a future Common Frame of Reference as well as to a possible reform of Art. 5 
Rome Convention, the formulation of which seems to be essential in preventing the 
described worst case scenario. Once again, however, it should be stressed that there 
are fundamental concerns with regard to the third scenario, being a “second best 
solution” only. 
 
 
1. The Multiple Directive Launching System: a Call for a Moratorium 
 
Preferably  the  Commission  should  stop  its  multiple  directive  launching  system  by 
means of a five-years moratorium on further harmonisation measures in the area of 
contract law. This time period should be used to focus all intellectual capacities on 
the drafting of a European optional code, which could build on the results of the 
extensive research made available during the last decade. Since the drafting of rules 
and principles of general European contract law has advanced considerably, one of 
the major remaining tasks is the integration of the mandatory European consumer 
contract law into this framework. In terms of coherence and consistency the draft-
ing of a uniform definition of the consumer contract applicable throughout substan-
tive and procedural (including conflict rules and jurisdiction) contract law is essen-
tial. For such definition provides for the central distinction between mandatory and 
facilitative rules in European contract law. 
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2. A Common Frame of Reference: Defining the Consumer Contract 
 
A general definition of the consumer contract as part of the Common Frame of Ref-
erence could read as follows: 
 
 
“A  consumer  contract is  a  contract,  under  which  the  characteristic 
performance is to be effected by a person (the “business”) in the course 
of its trade or profession in exchange for any consideration, if the other 
party (the “consumer”) according to the external circumstances or its 
representations obviously is acting outside its trade or profession. A 
contract concluded under a sales, service-provision, or other marketing 
scheme directed predominantly towards consumers is deemed to be a 
consumer contract.” 
 
With regard to the first part of the first sentence of the definition it has been shown 
above that all kinds of contracts between a business and a consumer should be cov-
ered, where the business effects the characteristic performance in exchange for any 
consideration by the consumer (see supra at para. 29-34). The problems related with 
the concept of the supply of goods and services, or the supply of property, which 
are often construed by the judiciary in a too narrow way, could be overcome by this 
extension, drawing on the concept of the characteristic performance established in 
Art. 4(2) Rome Convention. 
 
With regard to the second part of the first sentence, i.e. the definition of the con-
sumer, it is made clear that the intention of the consumer to conclude the contract 
“for private, family, or household use” (see Art. 2 a CISG), or to put it the other way 
around, “for a purpose which can be regarded as being outside his trade or profession” 
(Art. 5 ( 1 ) Rome Convention and the similar definition in the quoted Consumer 
Directives) should be obvious to the business in advance as expressed e.g. by Art. 2 
a) CISG: “unless the seller, at any time before or at the conclusion of the contract, neither 
knew nor ought to have known that the goods were bought for any such use.”105 This quali-
fication is essential to businesses, because otherwise they would not be able to ei-
ther exclude consumers from their marketing scheme or to calculate prices and to 
draft terms and conditions in accordance with the consumer protection rules, and – 
most importantly – to comply with any applicable information obligation (see su-
pra para. 37-38). Art. 5 Rome Convention is already interpreted in the light of the 
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solution of Art. 2 a) CISG by the majority of legal scholars.106 However, this inter-
pretation is contested and not yet supported by any precedence. It should, there-
fore, be integrated into the definition. 
 
Thus, the second part of the first sentence makes it clear, that the intention of the 
consumer, which as an internal fact generally remains private, shall be recognisable 
to the business on the basis of the external circumstances or the representations 
given by the consumer. Such definition is inherent as well to many national con-
sumer protection laws, e.g. to the British Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, which 
defines the consumer as “a person who neither makes the contract in the course of 
the business nor holds himself out as doing so”.107 The business is generally held not to 
be obliged to ask its customers if they act as consumers or in the course of their 
trade or business. However, if the customer is asked for the purpose of the contract 
and makes a wrong representation, then she should be treated accordingly. This is 
especially important in E-Commerce transactions, where there are usually no ex-
ternal circumstances which would allow the business to decide whether or not it 
deals with a consumer.108 An example could be the purchase of a computer from 
the distant seller Dell, where the customer entering the internet distribution portal 
is offered a separate “private” and “business” distribution channel. In the latter 
channel the customer may choose between a “1Year Collect and Return Service” up 
to a “5 Year On-Site Next Business Day Service Support”.109 Here a consumer hold-
ing himself out as being a professional and, thus,  profiting from a substantially 
lower price, should later-on not be able to rely on the minimum guarantee period of 
two years provided for in Art. 5( 1 ) of the Consumer Sales Directive. 
 
However, where no such expressed representation is requested from a customer, 
one will have to rely on the external circumstances as they were recognisable to the 
business.  One  of  the  most  important  external  circumstances  is  the  distribution 
                                                 
106   Which interpretation builds on the report of Guliano/Lagarde (OJ C 282 of 31/10/1980 S. 1-50): 
see Magnus, in: STAUDINGER (2002), Art. 29 EGBGB N. 38; Heiss, in: Czernich/Heiss, EVÜ, Art. 5 
N. 8; Glatt, INTERNETVERTRÄGE, 2002, p. 105-109; Foss/Bygrave, International Consumer Pur-
chases Trough the Internet, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF LAW AND IT 2000 8(99), all with further 
references. 
107   See Spindler/Börner (eds.), E-COMMERCE RECHT IN EUROPA UND DEN USA, 2003, at 281. 
108   An exception may be a characteristic performance, which usually can be used for private use 
only, or a contract, where the volume or value usually is only demanded by businesses: see Fer-
rari, in: Schlechtriem (ed.), CISG-KOMMENTAR, 3rd ed. 2000, Art 2 N. 17 f.; However, the major-
ity of all products and services can be used for private and/or professional use. Thus, there 
should be a clear distinction in advance, based on the external circumstances or the representa-
tions of the parties. 
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channel used by the business. Sentence two of the definition, therefore, states that a 
contract  concluded  under  a  sales,  service-provision,  or  other  marketing  scheme 
directed predominantly towards consumers is deemed to be a consumer contract. 
This presumption is intended first of all to make things very clear and easy in case 
of all distribution channels directed to consumers, e.g. super-markets, department-
stores, and other retailers involved in the distribution of consumer products, but 
also in case of the provision of services. The general rule would be that a business 
offering products to the general public without differentiating between private and 
business customers will in any case do so subject to consumer contract law. 
 
An intended side-effect of such presumption will be, however, that small businesses 
purchasing from consumer distribution channels will be protected as well. Thus, an 
entrepreneur buying coffee and milk for its employees in a super-market, or any 
other product like a telephone, computer or even a car in a consumer distribution 
channel without being asked for or otherwise expressing its intention of business 
(or at least dual) use would eventually be treated as a consumer. This effect, how-
ever, is legitimate in view of the basic equality rule of justice, i.e. treating like cases 
alike. There is simply no reason to treat a business differently that paid the same 
price and received the same product and service as a consumer, while the other 
party (the business, effecting the characteristic performance) obviously did not care 
about the private or business status of its customers. 
 
The proposed definition of consumer contracts is thus not only providing for legal 
certainty and predictability, but as well for a kind of opt-in and opt-out model which is a 
solution to a fundamental problem with the concept of contractual consumer pro-
tection. The traditional consumer protection measures are often criticised for not 
being purposeful and specific enough in targeting the situations where protection is 
really needed. On the one hand, this critique is aiming at the over-protection due to 
the  involved  paternalism  towards  the  consumer,  restricting  its  private  autonomy 
without any exception by not allowing a private person to opt-out of the protection 
regime even where that would be an informed choice and/or in the objective inter-
est of the consumer in an individual situation. On the other hand, consumer protec-
tion is often criticised for the inherent under-protection with regard to SMEs, which 
are held to be in need of protection as much as consumers, specifically where in-
formation asymmetries are addressed.110  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
110   See the detailed analysis at Calliess, Nach der Schuldrechtsreform: Perspektiven des 
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3. Art. 5 Rome Convention: Reflecting the Rise of European Contract Law 
 
A reformed Art. 5 of the Rome Convention should read as follows: 
 
( 1 ) This article applies to a contract, under which the characteristic performance is 
to be effected by a person (the “business”) in the course of its trade or profession in 
exchange for any consideration, if the other party (the “consumer”) according to the 
external circumstances or its representations obviously is acting outside its trade or 
profession. A contract concluded under a sales, service-provision, or other market-
ing  scheme  directed  predominantly  towards  consumers  is  deemed  to  be  a  con-
sumer contract. 
 
(2) A consumer contract shall be governed by the law of the country in which the 
consumer has its habitual residence at the time of the conclusion of the contract. If 
the business can establish that it as a result of the conduct of the consumer at any 
time before or at the conclusion of the contract neither knew nor ought to have 
known the country in which the consumer had its habitual residence, the law of the 
country where the business in good faith expected the habitual residence of the 
consumer to be shall apply. However, the law of the country where the place of 
business which under the contract was to effect the characteristic performance is 
situated shall apply, if 
 
(a)  the business could reasonably neither know nor have a good faith expecta-
tion with regard to the country of the consumer’s habitual residence, or 
(b)  the consumer travelled to the country where the involved place of business 
is situated and there concluded the contract, or  
(c)  the characteristic performance (e.g. the actual delivery of goods or supply 
of services) was or should have been effected exclusively in that country,  
 
unless, in case b) or c), the consumer was induced by the business to travel to the 
aforementioned country to conclude the contract. 
 
(3) In accordance with Art. 3 the parties may choose the application of the law of a 
Member State of the EC or EEA, with which the contract has a close connection. If 
the  contract  is  concluded  through  or  the  performance  is  executed  by  a  branch, 
agency or other establishment of the business located in one of the Member States, 
there is a close connection to that state. This choice is valid only, if the consumer 
was clearly informed about it in advance.  
[Additionally, if dépeçage shall be allowed for: However, the choice shall not prevent the 
application of the mandatory protection rules of the law of another Member State, 
which is applicable according to Article 5 paragraph 2, if the law chosen does not 
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unfair to the consumer. The protection is deemed to be equivalent, if the respective 
mandatory rules are minimum harmonised by EC-Directives transposed into both 
laws.] 
 
Para. 1 contains the definition of the consumer contract as explained above. Para. 2 
deals with the applicable law in the absence of a choice and draws on the solution 
proposed by the GEDIP. The application of the law of the country where the con-
sumer has its habitual residence is extended in order to cover E-Commerce transac-
tions. However, it is made clear that a consumer misleading the business about its 
country of habitual residence is protected by the laws of the state, where the busi-
ness expected this place to be in good faith. The exceptions b) and c) are taken from 
the proposal of GEDIP, however, exception a) is included in order to deal with on-
line delivery of non-tangible goods or services in accordance with the UCITA solu-
tion.111 
 
Para. 3 sentence 1 limits the choice of law to the laws of the Member States in order 
to ensure that the minimum protection  of the  European consumer directives be 
guaranteed in all cases where European courts have jurisdiction. Sentence 2 makes 
clear, that a third-state business may choose the application of the law of the mem-
ber state, where it maintains a branch, or at least an agency or other establishment. 
The last two terms broaden the home-state principle in accordance with Art. 15 (2) 
Brussels  I  Regulation,  which  subjects  businesses  without  a  domicile,  but  with  a 
branch (i.e. a place of business in terms of Art. 4 (2) Rome Convention), agency or 
other establishment in the EU to European jurisdiction. Sentence 3 introduces an 
obligation to inform the consumer on the fact of the choice of law (but not on the 
content  of  the  law  chosen)  before  concluding  the  contract,  in  order  to  prevent 
choice of law clauses to be hidden somewhere in the general business terms and 
conditions where they are never read.  
 
The proposed solution would completely abolish the situation of dépeçage since it 
results in unnecessary complexity of adjudication and, due to the cumulative appli-
cation of two different consumer protection regimes, in an unfair over-protection of 
the consumer. A choice of law clause would thus come to effect only, where the 
laws of the consumer state do not apply (see supra para. 37-38). However, if in the 
course of the reform project a different approach should be taken, which would 
allow for dépeçage and thus would make a comparison between two different con-
sumer protection regimes necessary, then it is essential to ensure that the fact of the 
minimum harmonisation of the Member State’s contract laws with regard to con-
                                                 
111   See supra para. 38 with note 85 372                                              GERMAN LAW JOU RNA L                 [Vol. 04  No. 04 
sumer protection is reflected by a presumption of equivalence as proposed in sen-
tences 4 and 5 (see supra para. 43-46, 54). 
 
 
 